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Taxation of Sleeping Cars.-Constitutional Law.Interstate Commerce.-A State may tax the carsof aforeigz
sleeping car company, employed in interstate commerce, and
which run into, through and out of suck State, and may ascertain the proportion of the property of such company, upon which
the tax should be placed, by taking as a basis of assessment suck
proportion of the capital stock of the company as the number of
miles over which it runs cars within the State bears to the whole
number of miles in that and other States over which its cars are
run. An Act imposing such a tax is a valid and constitutional
law.
BRADLEY, FIELD and HARLAN, JJ., dissenting.
STATEMENT OF CASE.

In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania.
This was an action brought by the State of Pennsylvania
against Pullman's Palace Car Company, a corporation of Illinois, in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, to recover the amount of a tax settled by the Auditor General, and approved by the Treasurer of that State,
for the years i87o-188o, inclusive, on the defendant's capital
stock, taking as a basis of assessment such proportion of its
capital stock as the number of miles of railroad over which
the cars were run by the defendant in Pennsylvania, bore to
the whole number of miles in this and other States over which
its cars were run. All these taxes were levied under successive statutes of Pennsylvania, imposing taxes on the capital
stock of corporations incorporated by the laws of Pennsylvania or of any other State, and doing business in Pennsylvania, computed on a certain percentage of dividends made
or declared.
A trial by Jury was waived, and the case submitted to the
decision of the Court, which found the following facts: "The
defendant is a corporation of the State of Illinois, having its
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principal office in Chicago. Its business was, during all the
time for which tax is charged, to furnish sleeping coaches and
parlor and dining room cars to the various railroad companies,
with which it contracted on the following terms: The defendant furnished the coaches and cars, and the company attached
and made them part of their trains, no charge being made
by either party against the other. The railroad companies
collected the usual fare from passengers who traveled in their
coaches and cars, and the defendant collected a separate charge
for the use of the seats, sleeping berths and other conveniences.
Business has been carried on continuously by defendant in
Pennsylvania since February 17, I87o, and it had about onehundred coaches and cars engaged in this way in the State
during that time. The cars used in the State, have during all
the time for which tax is charged, been running into and
through, and out of this State." Upon these facts the Court
held" that the proportion of the capital stock of the defendant
invested and used in Pennsylvania is taxable under these acts;
and that the amount of the tax may be properly ascertained
by taking as a basis the proportion which the number of miles
operated by the defendant in this State bears to the whole
number of miles operated by it, without regard to the question
whether any particular car or cars were used ;" and therefore
gave judgment for the State. That judgment was affirmed
upon writ of error by the Supreme Court of the State, for reasons stated in its opinion as follows: "We think it very clear
that the plaintiff in error is engaged in carrying on such a
business within this commonwealth as to subject it to the
statutes imposing taxation. While the tax on the capital stock
of a company is a tax on its property and assets, yet the capital stock of a company and its property and assets are not
identical. The coaches of the company are its property.
They are operated within this State. They are daily passing
from one end of the State to the other. They are used in
performing the functions for which the corporation was created.
The fact that they are also operated in other States cannot
wholly exempt them from taxation here. It reduces the value
of the property in the State, justly subject to taxation here.
This was recognized in the Court below, and we think the pro-
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portion was fixed according to a just and equitable rule."'
Pullman's Palace Car Company sued out a writ of error from
this Court, and filed six assignments of error, the substance
of which was summed up in the brief of its counsel as follows :
"The Court erred in holding that any part of the capital stock
of the Pullman Company was subject to taxation by the State
of Pennsylvania by reason of its running any of its cars into,
out of or through the State of Pennsylvania in the course of
their employment in the interstate transportation of railway
passengers.
Edward Isham,John S. Rummell, Win. Burry and il. E.
Olmsted for plaintiff in error.
W. S. Kirkpatr'ick and J.F. Sanderson for the commonwealth.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Upon the writ of error, whether this tax was in accordance with the law of Pennsylvania, is a question on which the
decision of the highest Court of the State is conclusive. The
only question of which this Court has jurisdiction is whether
the tax was in violation of the clause of the Constitution of
the United States, granting to Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the several States. The plaintiff in
error contends that its cars could be taxed only in the State
of Illinois, in which it was incorporated, and had its principal
place of business.
No general principles of law are better settled, or more
fundamental, than that the legislative power of every State
extends to all property within its borders, and that only so
far as the comity of that State allows can such property be
affected by the law of any other State. The old rule expressed
in the maxim mobilia sequnturpersonam, by which personal
property was regarded as subject to the law of the owner's
domicil, grew up in the Middle Ages, when movable property
consisted chiefly of gold and jewels, which could be easily
carried by the owner from place to place, or secreted in spots
Ilo7 Pa. St. 156, i6o.
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know only to himself. In modern times, since the great increase in amount and variety of personal property, not immediately connected with the person of the owner, that rule
has yielded 'more and more to the le sztus, the law of the
place where the property is kept and used.' As observed
by Mr. Justice Story, in his commentories just cited, "although
moveables are for many purposes to be deemed to have no
situs, except that of the domicil of the owner, yet this being
but a legal fiction, it yields, whenever it is necessary for the
the purpose of justice that the actual situs of the thing should
be examined. A nation within whose territory any personal
property is actually situate has an entire dominion over it
while therein, in point of soverignty and jurisdiction, as it has
over immovable property situated there."
For the purposes of taxation, as has been repeatedly
affirmed by this Court, personal property may be separated
from its owner; and he may be taxed, on its account, at the
place where it is, although not the place of his own domicil,
and even if he is not a citizen or a resident of the State which
imposes the tax.'
It is equally well-settled that there is nothing in the Constitution or laws of the United States, which prevents a State
from taxing personal property, employed in interstate or
foreign commeice, like other personal property within its
jurisdiction?
Ships or vessels, indeed engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce upon the high seas or other waters which are a
I Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 3o7, and 7 Wall. i39; Hfervey v. Rhode
Island Locomotive Works, 9 3 U. S. 644; Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663,
679; Walworth v. Harris, 129 U. S. 355 ; Story on Conflict of Laws, 5o;
1hiarton on Conflict of Laws, H 297-3Ii.
2

Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 77; Ceveland, P. &" A. R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 500, 323, 324, 328; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Peniston, i8
Wall. 5, 29; Tappan v. M11ferchants' Nat. Bank, i9 Wall. 490, 499; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 6o7, 6o8; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622;
Coe v. Errol, x6 U. S.517, 524; Ma rye v. Baltimore& Ohio R. R. Co., 127
U. S. 117, 123.
3Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 2o6, 232;

Ivestern Union Tel. Co.

v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 464; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Penn., ir4 U. S. x96,
206, 21I;
Western Union Tel. CO. v. Mass., 125 U. S. 530, 549; Ma rye. v.
Baltimore &" Ohio R. R. Co., 127 U. S. 117, 124; Leloup v. Port of Mobile
127
U. S. 640.
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common highway; and having their home port, at which they
are registered under the laws of the United States at the
,domicil of their owners in one State, are not subject to tax.ation in another State at whose ports they incidentally and
temporarily touch for the purpose of delivering or receiving
passengers or freight. But that is because they are not, in
.any proper sense, abiding within its limits, and have no continuous presence or actual situs within its jurisdiction, and
therefore can be only taxed only at their legal situs, their
home port and the domicil of their owners.'
Between the ships and vessels having their situs fixed by
act of Congress, and their course over navigable waters, and
touching land only incidentally and temporarily, and cars or
vehicles of any kind, having no situs so fixed, and traversing
the land only, the distinction is obvious. As has been said by
this court: "Commerce on land between the different States is
so strikingly dissimilar, in many respects, from commerce on
water, that it is often dificult to regard them in the same aspect
in reference to the respective constitutional powers and duties
.of the state and federal governments. No doubt commerce
by water was principally in the minds of those who framed
and adopted the Constitution, although both its language and
spirit embrace commerce by land as well. Maritime transportation requires no artificial roadway. Nature has prepared
to hand that portion of the instrumentality employed. The
navigable waters of the earth are recognized public highways
.of trade and intercourse. No franchise is needed to enable
the navigator to use them. Again, the vehicles of commerce
by water being instruments of inter-communication with other
nations, the regulation of them is assumed by the National
Legislature. So that State interference with transportation by
water, and especially by sea, is at once clearly marked and
distinctly discernable. But it is different with transportation
by land."'
IHays v. Pacific Mrail S. S. Co., 17 How. 596 ; St. Louis v. Wiggins
Ferry Co., ii Wall. 423; M11organ v. Carham, x6 Wall. 471 ; Wiggins Ferry
Co. v. East St. Louis, io7 U.S. 365 ; GloucesterFerry Co. v. Penn., 114 U. S
x96.
2 Balimore & Ohio R. Co., v. Marlland,21 Wall. 456, 470.
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In Gloucester Ferry Company v. Pennsylvania, on whichr
the plaintiff-in-error much relies, the New Jersey corporation
taxed by the State of Pennsylvania, under one of the statutes
now in question, had no property in Pennsylvania except a
lease of a wharf at which its steamboats touched to land and
receive passengers and freight carried across the Delaware
River; and the difference in the facts of that case and of this,
and in the rules applicable, was clearly indicated in the opinion of the Court as follows: " It is true that the property of
corporations engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, as
well as the property of corporations engaged in other business, is subject to taxation, provided always it be within
the jurisdiction of the State.
" While it is conceded that
the property in a State belonging to a foreign corporation
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce may be taxed
equally with like property of a domestic corporation engaged
in that business, we are clear that a tax or other burden imposed on the property of either corporation because it is used
to carry on that commerce, or upon the transportation of
persons or property, or for the navigation of the public waters
over which the transporation is made, is invalid and void as
an interference with, and an obstruction of, the power of Congress in the regulation of such Commerce."'
Much reliance is also placed by the plaintiff-in-error upon
the cases in which this Court has decided that citizens or corporations of one State cannot be taxed by another for a
license or privilege to carry on interstate or foreign commerce
within its limits. But in each of those cases the tax was not
upon the property employed in the business, but upon the
right to carry on the business at all, and was therefore held to
impose a direct burden upon the commerce itself.3 For
the same reason a tax upon the gross receipts derived from
the transportation of passengers and goods between one State
and other States or foreign nations has been held to be
1 114 U. S. 206.
2114 U. S. 211.
3

Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69, 74; Pickardv. Pullman S. C. Co,
117 U. S. 34, 43; Robins v. Shelby County Tax Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 497;
o
Leloup v. Port of .Joble,127 U. S. 64 , 644.
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invalid.'
The tax now in question is not a license tax or
a privilege tax; it is not a tax on business or occupation; it
is not a tax on, or because of, the tranportation, or the right
of transit, of persons or property through the State to other
States or countries. The tax is imposed equally on the corporations doing business within the State, whether domestic
or foreign, and whether engaged in interstate commerce or
not. The tax on the capital of the corporation, on account of
its property Aithin the State, is, in substance and effect, a tax
on that property. 2 This not only admitted, but insisted
on by the plaintiff in error.
The cars of his Company within the State of Pennsylvania are employed in interstate commerce; but their being so
employed does not exempt them from taxation by the State;
and the State has not taxed them because of their being so
employed, but because of their being within its territory and
jurisdiction. The cars were continuously and permanently
employed in going to and fro upon certain routes of travel.
If they had never passed beyond the limits of Pennsylvania, it
could not be doubted that the State could tax them, like other
property within its borders, notwithstanding they were employed
in interstate commerce. The fact that, instead of stopping at
the state boundary, they cross that boundary in going out
and coming back, cannot affect the power of the State to levy
a tax upon them. The State having the right for the purposes
of taxation, to tax any personal property found within its
jurisdiction, without regard to the place of the owner's domicil,
could tax the specific cars which at a given moment were
within its borders. The route over which the cars travel extending beyond the limits of the State, particular cars may not
remain within the State; but the Company has at all times.
substantially the same number of cars within the State, and
continuously and constantly uses there a portion of its property; and it is distinctly found, as matter of fact, that the
Company continuously, thoughout the periods for which
'Fargo v. Mectigan,

121

U. S.

230;

Philadeli:a & S. S. Co. v.

Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326.
2 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 496, 209;
Union Tel. Co. v. 3fass., 2,5 U. S., 530-552.
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these taxes were levied, carried on business in Pennsylvania,
and had about one hundred cars within the State.
The mode which the State of Pennsylvania adopted, to
ascertain the proportion of the Company's property upon
which it should be taxed in that State, was by taking as a
basis of settlement such proportion of the capital stock of the
Company as the number of miles over which it ran its cars
within the State bore to the whole number of miles, in that
and other States, over which its cars were run. This was a
just and equitable method of assessment; and if it were
adopted by all the States through which these cars ran, the
Company would be assessed upon the whole value of its capital stock, and no more.
The validity of this mode of apportioning such a tax is
sustained by several decisions of this Court, in cases which
came up from the Circuit Courts of the United States, and in
which therefore, the jurisdiction of this Court extended to the
determination of the whole case, and was not limited, as upon
writs of error to the State Courts, to questions under the Constitution and laws ot the United States.
In the State Railroad Tax Cases,' it was adjudged
that a Statute of Illinois, by which a tax on the entire
taxable property of a railroad corporation, including its
rolling stock, capital and franchize, as assessed by the State
Board of equilization and was collected in each municipality
in proportion to the length of the road within it, was lawful,
and not in conflict with the Constitution of the State; and Mr.
Justice Miller delivering judgement said:
"Another objection to the system of taxation by the State
is, that the rolling stock, capital stock and franchize are personal
property, and that this, with all other personal property has a
local situs at the principal place of business of the corporation,
and can be taxed by no other county, city or town but the
one where it is so situated. This objection is based upon the
general rule of law that personal property, as to its situs, follows the domicil of its owner. It may be doubted very reasonably whether such a rule can be applied to a railroad corporation as between the different localities embraced by its
'92 U-

S-575.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

line of road. But, after all the rule is merely the law of the
State which recognizes it; and when it is called into operation
as to property located in one State, and owned by a resident of
another, it is a rule of comity in the former State, rather than
an absolute principal in all cases.'
"Like all other laws of a State, it is therefore subject to
legislative repeal, modification or limitation; and when the
Legislature of Illinois declared that it should not prevail in
assessing personal property of railroad companies for taxation,
it simply exercised an ordinary function of legislation." 2
"It is further objected that the railroad track, capital
stock and franchise is not assessed in each country where it
lies, according to its value there, but accdrding to an aggregate value of the whole, on which each county, city and town
collects taxes according to the length of the track within its
limits." " It may well be doubted whether any better mode
of determining the value of that portion of the track within
any one county has been devised, than to ascertain the value
of the whole road, and apportion the value within the county
by its relative length to the whole." "This court -has
expressly held in two cases, 3 where the road of a corporation ran through different States, that a tax upon the income
or franchise of the road was properly apportioned by taking
the whole income or value of the franchise, and the length of
the road within each State, as the basis of each taxation. '
So in Western U. Tel. Co. v. Mass.,5 this court upheld
the validity of a tax imposed by the State of Massatelegraph company,
chusetts upon the capital stock oa
on account of property owned and used by it within the State,
taking as a basis of assessment such proportion of the value
of its capital stock as the length of its lines within the State
bore to their entire length throughout the country.
Even more in point is the case of .Mlarye v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co.,' in which the question was whether a
I Greer V. Van Buskirk. 5 Wall. 32.
2 92 U. S. 607, 608.
3 Delaware Railroad Tax, iS Wall. 2o6; Erie .R. Co. v. Penn. 21 Vall. 492.

492 U. S. 608, 611.
5
125 U. S. 530.
£627 U. S. 117.
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railroad company, incorporated by the State of Maryland,
-and no part of those whose own railroad was within the
State of Virginia, was taxable under the general laws of
,Virginia upon rolling stock owned by the company, and
employed upon connecting railroads leased by it in that
-State, yet not assigned. permanently to those roads, but used
interchangably upon them and upon roads in other States, as
the companys necessities required. It was held not to be so
taxable, solely because the Tax Laws of Virginia appeared on
their face to be limited to railroad corporations of that State;
and Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the unanimous judgment of of the court, said :
"It is not denied, as it cannot be, that the State of Virginia has rightful power to levy and collect a tax upon such
property used and found within its territorial limits, as this
property was used and found, if and whenever it may choose,
by apt legislation, to exert its authority over the subject. It
is quite true, as the sitzits of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company is in the State of Maryland, that also upon general
principles, is the situs of all its personal property; but for
purposes of taxation as well as for other purposes, that siits
may be fixed -in whatever locality the property may be
brought and used by its owner, by the law of the place where
it is found. If the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company is
permitted by the State of Virginia to bring into its territory,
and there habitually to use and employ, a portion of its
movable personal property, and the railroad company chooses
so to do, it would certainly be competent and legitimate for
the State to impose upon such property, thus used and
employed, its fair share of the burdens of taxation imposed
upon similar property used in the like way by its own citizens.
And such a tax might be properly assessed and collected in
cases like the present, where the specific and individual items
of property so used and- employed were not continuously the
same, but were constantly changing, according to the exigencies of the business. In such cases, the tax might be fixed
by an appraisement and valuation of the average amount of
the property thus habitually used, and collected by distraint
upon any portion that at any time be found. Of course, the
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OPINION.

lawfulness of the tax upon vehicles of transportation used by
common carriers might have to be considered in particular
instances with reference to its operation as a regulation of
commerce among the States, but the mere fact that they were
,employed as vehicles of transportation in the interchange of
of interstate commerce would not render their taxation
invalid."'
For these reasons and upon these authorities, the Court
is of opinion that the tax in question is constitutional and
valid. The result of holding otherwise would be that, if all
the States should concur in abandoning the legal fiction that
personal property has its situs at the owner's domicil, and in
adopting the system of taxing it at the place at which it is
used and by whose laws it is protected, property employed in
any business requiring continuous and constant movement
from one State to another would escape taxation altogether.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. JusTICE BROWN, not having been a member of the
Court when this case was argued, took no part in its decision.

DISSENTING

OPINION.

Mr. JrSTICE BRADLEY, with whom concurred

Mr.

JUSTICE

and Mr. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting:
I dissent from the judgment of the Court in this case, and
will state briefly my reasons, I concede that all property,
personal as well as real, within a State, and belonging there,
may be taxed by the State. Of that there can be no doubt.
But where property does not belong in the State another
question arises. It is the question of the jurisdiction of the
State over the property.
It is stated in the opinion of the Court as a fundamental
proposition on which the opinion really turns that all personal
as well as real property within a State is subject to the laws
thereof. I conceive that that proposition is not maintainable
as a general and absolute proposition. Amongst independent
1127 U. S. 123, 124.
FtELD,
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nations it is true, persons and property within the territory of
a nation are subject to its laws, and it is responsible to other
nations for any injustice it may do to the persons or'property
of such other nations. This' is a rule of international law.
But the States of this government are not independent nations.
There is such a thing as a Constitution of the United States,
and there is such a thing as a Government of the United
States, and there are many things, and nany persons, and
many articles of property that a State cannot' layy the weight
of its finger upon, because it would be contrary to the Constitution of the United States. Certainly,* property merely
carried through a State cannot be taxed by the State. Such
a tax .would be a duty which a State cannot impose. ' If a
drove of cattle is driven through Pennsylvania from Illinois to
New York for the purpose of being sold in New: York, whilst
in Pennsylvania it may be subject to the police regulations of
the State, but is not subject to taxation there. It is not
generally -subject to the law of the State as other pro lerty is.
So if a train of cars starts at Cincinnati for New York and
passes through Pennsylvania, it may be subject to the police
regulations of that State whilst within it, but it would be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States to tax it.
We have decided this very question in the case of State Freight
Tax.1 The point was directly raised and decided that
the property on its passage through a State in the course of
interstate commerce cannot be taxed by the State, because
taxation is incidentally regulation, and a State cannot regulate
interstate commerce. The same doctrine was recognized in
Coe v. Errol
And surely a State cannot interfere with the officers of
the United States, in the performance of their duties, whether
acting under the judicial, military, postal or revenue departments. They are entirely free from State control. So a
citizen of the United States, or any other -person, in the performance of any duty, or in the exercise 6f any privilege,
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, is
absolutely free from State control in relation to such matters.
1 5 IWal. 232.
2 i6 U. S. 517.
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So that the general proposition, that all persons and personal
property within the State are subject to the laws of the State,
unless materially modified, cannot be true.
But when personal property is permanently located
within a State for the purpose of ordinary use or sale, then
indeed, it is subject to the laws of the State and to the burdens
of taxation, as well when owned by persons residing out of
the State as when owned by persons residing in the State.
It has then acquired a situs in the State where it is found.
A man residing in New York may own a store, a factory
or a mine in Alabama, stocked with goods, utensils or
materials for sale or use in that State. There is no question
that the situs of personal property so situated is in the State
where it is found, and that it may be subjected to a double
taxation-in the State of the owner's residence, as a part of the
general mass of his estate; and in the State of its siu.
Although this is a consequence which often bears hardly on
the owner, yet it is too firmly sactioned by the law to be disturbed, and no remedy seems to exist but a sense of equity
and justice in the Legislatures of the several States. The rule
would undoubtedly be more just if it made the property
taxable, like lands and real estate, only in the place where it
is permanently situated.
Personal, as well as real, property may have a situs of its
own, independent of the owner's residence, even when employed in interstate or foreign commerce. An office or
warehouse connected with a steamship line, or with a continental railway, may be provided with furniture and all the
apparatus and appliances usual in such establisnments. Such
property would be subject to the lex rez sit and to local
taxation, though solely devoted to the purposes of the .business of those lines. But the ships that traverse the sea, and
the cars that traverse the land, in those lines, being the
vehicles of commerce, interstate or foreign, and intended for
its movement from one State or county to another, and having
no fixed or permanent situs or home, except at the residence
of the owner, cannot, without an invasion of the powers and
duties of the Federal Government, be subjected to the
burdens of taxation in the places where they only go or
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come in the transaction of their business, except where they
belong!
To contend that there is any difference between cars
or trains or ocean .steamships in this regard, is to lose
sight of the essential .qualities of the things. This is a matter
that does not depend upon the affirmative action of Congress.
The regulations of ships and vessels, by Act of Congress, does
not make them the instruments of commerce. They .would
be equally so if no such affirmative regulations existed. For
the States to interfere with them in either-case would be to
interfere with, and to assume the exercise of, that power
which by the Constitution has been surrendered by the States
to the Government of the United States, namely, the power
to regulate commerce.
: ;
Reference is made in the opinion of the Court, to the case
of Baltimore and Ohio RR. Company. vs. Marylahd,2 in
which it was said that commerce on land between the
different States is strikingly dissimilar in many respects from
commerce on water; but that was said in ireferente -to highways of transportation in the two cases, and the difference of
control which the State has in one case from "that which it
can possibly have in the other. A railroad is laid on the soil
of the State, by virtue of authority granted by the State, and
constantly subject to the police jurisdiction of the State;
while the sea and navigable rivers are highways created by
nature, and not subject to State control. The question in
that case related to the power of the State over its own corporation, in reference to its rate of fares and the remuneration
it was required to pay to the State for its franchises-an
entirely different question from that which arises in the
present case.
Reference is also made to expressions used in the
opinion in Gloucester Ferry Co. vs. Penn.,3 which, standing
alone would seem to concede the right of a State to tax

I Hays v. Pacific ai S. S. Co., 58 U. S. 17 How. 596; Mforgan v. Parltan,
83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471; f'Tteelin- ii. P. and C. Trans. Co. v. l7eeiing, 99
U. S. 273.
'2I Wall. 456.
14 U. S.
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foreign corporations engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, if such property is within the jurisdiction of the State.
But the whole scope of that opinion is to show that neither
the vehicles of commerce coming within the State, nor the
-capital of such corporations, is taxable there; but only the
property having a situs there, as a wharf used for landing
passengers and freight. The entire series of decisions to that
effect are cited and relied on.
Of course I do not mean to say that either railroad cars or
ships are to be free from taxation, but I do say that they are not
taxable by those States in which they are only transiently
present in the transaction of their commercial operations. A
British ship, coming to the harbor of New York from Liverpool ever so regularly and spending half its time (when not
.on the ocean) in that harbor, cannot be taxed by the State of
New York (harbor, pilotage and quarentine dues not being
taxes). So New York ships plying regularly to the port of
New Orleans, so that one of the line may be always lying at
the latter port, cannot be taxed by the State of Louisiana.
Cases above cited.' No more can a train of cars belonging in
Pennsylvania, and running regularly from Philadelphia to
New York, or to Chicago, be taxed by the State of
New York, in the one case, or by Illinois in the other. If it
may be lawfully taxed by these States, it may lawfully be
taxed by all the intermediate States, New Jersey, Ohio and
Indiana. And then we should have back again all the confusion and competition and State jealousies which existed before the adoption of the Constitution, and for putting an end
to which the Constitution was adopted.
In the opinion of the Court it is suggested that if all the
States should adopt as equitable a rule of proportioning the
taxes on the Pullman Company as that adopted by Pennsylvania, a just system of taxation of the whole capital stock of
the Compay would be the result. Yes, if-! But Illinois may
tax the Company on its whole capital stock. Whiere would
be the equity, then? This, however, is a consideration that
I Hailsv. Pacific Mfail S. S. CO., 17 Ho w. 596; forg-an v. Parham, i6Wall.
471; ITWecling II P. and C Trans. Co. v. 1IIeelin, 99 U. S. 273.
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cannot be compared with the question as to the power to tax
at all-as to the relative power of the State and general governments over the regulation -of internal commerce-as to the
right of States to resume those powers which have been vested
in the government of the United States.
It seems to me that the real question in the present case
is as to the situs of the cars in question. They are used in
interstate commerce, between Pennsylvania, New York, and
and the Western States. Their legal situs no more depends
on the States or places where they are carried in the course of
their operations than would that of any steamboats employed
*bythe Pennsylvania Railroad Company to carry passengers on
the Ohio or Mississippi. If such steamboats belonged to a
company located at Chicago, and were changed from time to
time as their condition as to repairs and the convenience of
the owners might render necessary, is it possible that the States
in which .they were running and landing in the exercise of
interstate commerce could subject them to taxation? No one,
I think, would contend this. It seems to me that the cars in
question, belonging to the Pullman Car Company, are in precisely the same category.
The case of Western U. Tel. Co. vs. Mass.,' is entirely
different from the present. In that case there was no
question as to the situs of the property taxed. It was
situated within the States consisting of poles and wires, and
offices, and a general plant for telegraphic purposes. The
property belonged in Massachusetts, and was consequently
taxable there. There was a phase of that case which led some
of the Justices of the Court to doubt as to the proper decision
to be made. The difficulty was this: The tax was in terms,
made upon a certain proportional part of the capital stock of
the company. That proportion was regulated by the number
of miles of telegraph within the State, as compared with the
number of miles of telegraph belonging to the company in the
whole country. It was objected that the property of the company situated in Massachusetss had no necessary relation to the
said proportion of the capital stock, because the aggregate
value of the stock might depend on property, franchises and
1125 U. S. 530.

DISSENTING OPINION.

the amount of business outside of Massachusetts, largely out
of proportion to the miles of telegraph lines outside of that
State. But the difficulty of getting at the true value of the
property within the State, and of adopting any other rule for
ascertaining it, as well as the failure of the company to show
that the rule adopted produced any unfair results, finally,
induced an acquiesence in the decision; but expressly on the
ground that, though the tax was but nominally on the shareof the capital stock. of the company, it was in effect a tax upon
the property owned and used by it in Massachusetts, the proportional length of the lines in that State to their entire length
throughout the whole country being merely used as a basis
for ascertaining the value of that property. The same difficulty as to the method of determining value exists in the
present case which existed in that; but the more serious
difficulty lies in the question of the si/ls of the property
and the consequent jurisdiction of the State of Pennsylvania
to tax it. It is not fast property; it does not consist of real
estate; it does not attach itself to' the land; it is movable and
engaged in interstate commerce, not in Pennsylvania alone,
but in that and other States, and the question is, How can
such property be taxed by a State to which it does not belong?
It is indirectly, but virtually, taxing the passengers,-many of
them carried from New York to Chicago or from Chicago to
New York, and most of them from one State to another. It
is clearly a burden on interstate commerce. The opinion of
the Court is based on the idea that the cars are taxable in
Pennsylvania because a certain number 'continuously abide
there. But how can they be said to abide there when
they only stop at Philadelphia and other stations to take on
passengers? And it is all the same whether they cross the
State entirely, or run into, or out of other States with a
terminus in Pennsylvania.
It is only by virtue of such of its property as is situated
in Pennsylvania that the Pullman Company can be taxed
there. Its capital as such is certainly not taxable there.
In the case of Western Union Telegraph Company v.
Massachusetts, the tax was sustained only on the ground that
it was a tax on the property in Massachusetts. The idea that

